"In all affairs it's a healthy thing now and then to hang a question mark on the things you have long taken for granted." Bertrand Russell
Abstract: The arguments against scientific misconduct one finds in the literature generally fail to support current policies on research fraud: they may not prove wrong what is typically considered research misconduct and they tend to make wrong things that are not usually seen as scientific fraud, in particular honest errors. I also argue that the rule enjoining scientists to honestly seek the truth is internal to science, therefore society cannot legitimately enforce it. Moreover it is not a moral rule, and contriving the search for truth as a matter of morality belittles science.
Abstract: The concept of neutralization —originally developed for juvenile delinquents— has been widely used in the context of cheating. Students are said to believe that cheating is wrong yet to deny that what they did is wrong or to blame someone else. I argue that authors who make claims of findings of neutralization generally cannot substantiate them. They overinterpret their data, taking ‘does not contradict the theory’ as meaning ‘proves the theory.’ I also point out that purely empirical data cannot be enough, since neu¬tral¬iza¬tion requires some theory of what is wrong behavior, and no such theory has been provided so far.
Abstract: It is generally agreed that exams must be fair; yet what this exactly means is not made clear. One may mean fairness of treatment: but this merely propagates the fairness or unfairness of pre-existing rules. Fair opportunity on the other hand necessarily leads to equal results for everyone, which clearly makes it inapplicable. Neither view is helpful to make decisions on competing claims: fairness of treatment ignores the problem and fairness of opportunity holds all claims to be equally valid. To escape this deadlock, we turn to the possibility of basing decisions on an external criterion — the future success as engineers of the students. This provides us with a general framework to distinguish between conflicting claims: the exam should favour whatever would be good in an engineer.
Abstract: According to the code of ethics of the National Society of Professional Engineers, engineers must "hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public." Several kinds of arguments have been employed to show that engineers (and other professionals) have such a duty towards the population. Some authors have claimed that this duty is part of the very essence of professionalism; but such an argument is invalid, which relies on an ambiguity on the meaning of 'professional.' Professional codes of ethics, since they are based on consensual opinions rather than on objective facts, create a duty to the population only for those who already care about the population, i.e. they apply only to those who do not need a code. It is then clear that the source of codes of conduct (and of the duty to the public) cannot be ethics. They may be public relations or they may provide support and protection from fellow professionals. But such codes of conduct cannot provide unconditional duties to the population.
Abstract: It seems so obvious that cheating is wrong that providing a justification is not a main concern: most of the research is empirical and focuses on quantification and correlations. I look at a number of reasons why cheating may be wrong: it provides an unfair advantage over other students, it hinders learning, and it is dishonest. They are unexpectedly weak (often not proving that cheating is wrong) or have consequences that few would endorse, e.g. showing that cheaters should not be punished or that teachers too should be. I finally argue that if instead of asking 'is cheating wrong?' one asks 'what should the students do?' one is forced to provide a concrete solution. Then one can no longer hide behind words such as 'cheating' to avoid dealing with reality.
Abstract: Plagiarism is a crime against academy. It deceives readers, hurts plagiarized authors, and gets the plagiarist undeserved benefits. However, even though these arguments do show that copying other people's intellectual contribution is wrong, they do not apply to the copying of words. Copying a few sentences that contain no original idea (e.g. in the introduction) is of marginal importance compared to stealing the ideas of others. The two must be clearly distinguished, and the 'plagiarism' label should not be used for deeds which are very different in nature and importance.
Abstract: Whistle-blowing is generally considered from the viewpoint of professional morality. Morality rejects the idea of choice and the interests of the professional as immoral. Yet the dreadful retaliations against the messengers of the truth make it necessary to bring the needs of the whistle blower back into the picture. To leave a way out of whistle-blowing, morality forges rights (sometimes called duties) that trump duty to the public prescribed by professional codes, thereby trying to hide the obvious fact that the choice of speaking up or remaining silent is indeed a choice, not a matter of objective duty. Accounting for the interests of the individual directly would be more honest than manufacturing ad hoc rights and duties. One should also notice that if it fails to achieve anything then blowing the whistle was the wrong decision. Yet there is a tendency to judge whistle-blowing mostly based on the motivation of the whistle blower. It is seen as essentially self-sacrifice, so that saving lives is wrong if one's heart is not pure. Yet, it is logically impossible to hold whistle-blowing to be mandatory and consider that whistle blowers are heroes.
Abstract: Many people hold this truth to be self-evident, that there should be more female students in science and engineering. Typical arguments include possible benefits to women, possible benefits to the economy, and the unfairness of the current female under-representation. However, these justifications are never explicitly and thoroughly presented. Clearly stating and scrutinizing them, we show that they in fact have logical flaws. When made consistent, these arguments do not unconditionally justify enrolling more women in scientific disciplines. In particular, what women want must be taken into account. Outreach programs towards K-12 girls must therefore purport to allow them to choose a field freely, rather than try to draw as many of them to scientific disciplines as possible. This change of mindset must be accompanied by a close examination of the purpose and effects of these programs.
Abstract: Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?). Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously 'prove' that egoism (or even simply accounting for one's interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the 'moral reasoning' process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian.
Abstract: Prominent ethical and policy issues such as affirmative action and female enrollment in science and engineering revolve around the idea that diversity is good. However, a precise definition is seldom provided. I show that diversity may be construed as a factual description, a craving for symmetry, an intrinsic good, an instrumental good, a symptom, or a side effect. These acceptions differ vastly in their nature and properties. Some are deeply mistaken and some others cannot lead to concrete policies. It is thus necessary to clarify what one means by 'diversity.' It may be a neutral description of a given state; but this is insufficient to act. The idea that there should be the same representation in a specific context as in the overall population is both puzzling and arbitrary. Diversity as intrinsic good is a mere opinion, which cannot be concretely applied; moreover, the most commonly invoked forms of diversity (sexual and racial) are not intrinsically good. On the other hand, diversity as instrumental good can be evaluated empirically and can give rise to policies, but these may be very weak. Finally, symptoms and side effects are not actually about diversity. I consider the example of female enrollment in science and engineering, interpreting the various arguments found in the literature in light of this polysemy.
© Mathieu Bouville, March 22nd 2010 Back to the main page.